

Security of Cloud Technology — How to Secure Cloud Email Senders from Impersonation



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Sender Impersonation Case Study

October 5th , 2023

proofpoint.

Agenda



Sender Impersonation



The Very Unfortunate Tale of Trezor



SPF Flattening, Look A like Detection, Filter Email Relay



Summary

Sender Impersonation Impacts...

Brand Reputation




Customer Service | Marketing | Accounts Payable

Sender Impersonation Can Come In Many Forms...

- 1) Domain Spoof
- 2) Domain Look A like
- 3) Legitimate sending system compromise

Trezor was targeted as part of a wider attack that took in over 100 Crypto and Finance companies

Multi vector, the attack depended on email
<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fake-trezor-data-breach-emails-used-to-steal-cryptocurrency-wallets/>



Email Authentication – Critical Part of the Solution?

How can we be sure the sender is who they say they are?

DMARC

DMARC ensures the From address that users **see in their email client is trustworthy**

SPF

SPF allows organisations to declare (in DNS) what IP addresses **can send on their behalf**.


DKIM

DKIM ensures that messages **aren't tampered with in transit**, utilising cryptography.


DMARC Benefits

- SPF/DKIM authentication and alignment.
- Determine what to do with email that fails authentication.
- 'From' address can be trusted by users

How DMARC Works?



Why Email Authentication is Important



What the user sees:

```
Delivered-To: bert.wong@acme.com
Received: by 10.79.114.17 with SMTP id n17csp15281601vc;
  Mon, 1 Aug 2016 02:31:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Received: by 10.25.39.85 with SMTP id n82mr85507411fb.29.1470043867531;
  Mon, 01 Aug 2016 02:31:07 -0700 (PDT)
Return-Path: blackhat@phisher.com>
Received: from mail-lf0-x22f.google.com (mail-lf0-x22f.google.com)
  by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id y195si138827481fd.1470043867531;
  for <bert.wong@acme.com>
  (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128);
  Mon, 01 Aug 2016 02:31:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of blackhat@phisher.com
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
  dkim=pass header.i=@phisher.com;
  spf=pass domain of blackhat@phisher.com> designates
```

The actual sender:
blackhat@phisher.com

Passes SPF & DKIM

Trezor's SPF Record at Time of Attack

- v=DMARC1; p=reject;
rua=mailto:06b6370b8ec49e557257d38fd38e03-d@dmarc.report-uri.com
- v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:_spf.google.com
include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.salesforce.com
include:shops.shopify.com -all

SPF Flattening

Hosted SPF spf523.example.com

spf523.example.com

Service Status LEAVE SERVICE

ENROLLED
Start managing senders by adding senders to the Proofpoint Hosted SPF record.

Overview
List of senders based on the current SPF record

CURRENT SPF RECORD MANAGE SENDERS

6 Senders + ADD SENDERS

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name ↑	Sender Includes or Sending IPs	In SPF Record Proofpoint-hosted
<input type="checkbox"/>	Hayneedle	include:spf.hayneedle.com	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Hayneedle	include:marketing.hayneedle.com	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Minecast	include:_netblocks.minecast.com	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Salesforce	exists:%()_spf.corp.salesforce.com	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Proofpoint DEDICATED	ip4:68.233.77.18 ip4:66.77.69.12	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Proofpoint	ip4:91.209.104.0/25	No

Improved efficiency

- Overcome the DNS lookup limit of 10
- Reduce overhead of making SPF updates
- Real-time propagation

Better security

- Obfuscate senders published in your SPF record
- Simplify SPF record by identifying authorized but unused IP addresses
- Eliminate 3rd party SPF risk by maintaining last known good SPF record.

SPF Macros In Mail Flow

Sending MTA

```
MFROM: bounce@sendmail.org  
EHLO: smtp.mta.net  
IP: 1.2.3.4
```



Transmit message



Receiving MTA

Retrieve SPF record for sendmail.org



Expand macro elements and generate DNS query for
1.2.3.4 smtp.mta.net sendmail.org
has.pphosted.com

DNS

```
v=spf1 include:%{i}_%{h}_%{d}_has.pphosted.com -all
```



SPF Flattening Service Provider

Positive response:
v=spf1 1.2.3.4 -all



Dynamically Identify Lookalike Domains



SCAN

Continually scan over 400 million domains for threats



CLASSIFY

Automatically classify domains and identify potential BEC domains



INVESTIGATE


Provide detailed intel around registrant info, email traffic, web content; achieve workflow flexibility



RESPOND

- Add to block list
- Limit access
- Permanently remove via Virtual Takedown add-on


Rapid Enforcement



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
Filtering outbound Email from 3rd party Senders



Non-DMARC compliant
insecure application email



Secure, DMARC compliant
application email



Secure Cloud Email Senders from Impersonation

- 1) **Domain Spoof** – Email Authentication and Obfuscate Senders
- 2) **Domain Look A Like** – Detection, Rapid Response and Take Down
- 3) **Legitimate Sending System Compromise** – Scan Outbound Email from all system, not just your corporate gateway...

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