

MNSEC 2022

**SOC**

**process improvement**

UNITEL LLC IDERBUKH.I

# WHO AM I?

## MUST-SICT

- Bachelor 2013-2017
- Master 2017-2020

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@MUST-SICT, Assistant teacher 2017-2019

@UNITEL LLC, Information security analyst


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# AGENDA

- Defination of Security Operation Center
- Endpoint security assessment
  - System and process monitor
  - Detection & prevention capability measure
  - Breach and attack simulation
- Detection coverage
- Result



# Security Operation Center

Security Operation Center (SOC) is a centralized function within an organization employing people, processes, and technology to continuously monitor and improve an organization's security posture while preventing, detecting, analyzing, and responding to cybersecurity incidents.



# Endpoint Security Assessment

- According to a study by the Ponemon Institute, 68% of organizations have experienced one or more endpoint attacks that successfully compromised data and/or their IT infrastructure.
- 53% of organizations were hit by a successful ransomware attack in 2021, and around 77% of those were hit more than once.
- Virtual team, Red and Blue work together to improve the overall security of the organization.
- Goal - Red Team emulates adversary TTPs while blue teams watch and improve detection and response policies, procedures, and technologies in real time.





# MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX

# RED ATOMIC TEAM

Tactic {

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection
Hardware Additions	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark	Distributed Component	Clipboard Data
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Applnit DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypr Acc				

### Drive-by Compromise

A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components:

Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:

- A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting.
- Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.
- Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).

Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.<sup>[1]</sup>

Drive-by Compromise Technique	
ID	T1189
Tactic	Initial Access
Platform	Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions Required	User
Data Sources	Packet capture, Network device logs, Process use of network, Web proxy, Network intrusion detection system, SSL/TLS inspection

## Technique

## Procedure

43 lines (28 sloc) 1.79 KB

Raw Blame History

## T1007 - System Service Discovery

### Description from ATT&CK

Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.

Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

Platforms: Windows

Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring

Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM

### Atomic Tests

- Atomic Test #1 - System Service Discovery

### Atomic Test #1 - System Service Discovery

Identify system services

Supported Platforms: Windows

Inputs

Name	Description	Type	Default Value
service_name	Name of service to start stop, query	string	svchost.exe

Run it with `command_prompt` !

```
tasklist.exe
sc query
sc query state= all
sc start ${servicename}
sc stop ${servicename}
wmic service where (displayname like "${servicename}") get name
```

# SYSMON

## Sysinternals - System monitor v14

- Windows
- Linux - 2021

Created by: Mark Russinovich and Thomas Garnier - Defrag tools

### RECOMMENDED

#### SwiftOnSecurity/**sysmon-config**










Sysmon configuration file template with default high-quality event tracing



18 40 4k 1k

<https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config>

# SYSTEM AND PROCESS MONITOR

- Process Create & Terminated 
- File create & delete 
- Network connection 
- Powershell & cmd command 
- DNSQuery 
- CreateRemoteThread 
- Registry Event 
- WmiEvent 
- **FileBlockExecutable** 

# DETECTION & PREVENTION CAPABILITY MEASURE



We believe purple teams using VECTR is the best way to assess and validate cybersecurity detections and improve SOC capabilities.

- Open source
- Planing and tracking Red team & Purple team
- Create new assessment template
- Powerful report
- Automated Adversary emulation

DEMO\_AUTOMATION / Automated Attack Campaigns 2021 / ATT&CK Endpoint Campaign - October 2021

### ATT&CK Endpoint Campaign - October 2021: Escalation Path

### Timeline


- 10/20/2021 13:49:36 T1136.001 - Create a new user in a command prompt : outcome changed to Detected
- 10/20/2021 13:49:15 T1057 - Process Discovery - tasklist : outcome changed to NotDetected
- 10/20/2021 13:48:56 T1003.001 - Powershell Mimikatz : outcome changed to Blocked
- 10/20/2021 13:06:48 T1027 - Execute base64-encoded PowerShell : outcome changed to NotDetected
- 10/20/2021 13:02:50 T1003.002 - Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets : outcome changed to Detected
- 10/20/2021 13:02:31 T1027 - Execute base64-encoded PowerShell : outcome changed to Blocked

### Test Cases

Phase	Technique	Test Case	Status	Outcome	Tags	Action
Defense Evasion	Rename System Utilities	T1036.003 - Masquerading - cscript.exe running as notepad.exe	Completed	Not Detected	INVESTIGATE	[Icons]
Execution	PowerShell	T1059.001 - PowerShell Command Execution	Completed	Detected	VALIDATE	[Icons]
Credential Access	Security Account Manager	T1003.002 - Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets	Completed	Detected	VALIDATE	[Icons]
Defense Evasion	Obfuscated Files or Information	T1027 - Execute base64-encoded PowerShell	Completed	Not Detected	PRIORITY	[Icons]
Credential Access	LSASS Memory	T1003.001 - Powershell Mimikatz	Completed	Blocked		[Icons]
Discovery	Process Discovery	T1057 - Process Discovery - tasklist	Completed	Not Detected	INVESTIGATE	[Icons]
Persistence	Local Account	T1136.001 - Create a new user in a command prompt	Completed	Detected		[Icons]



# VECTR DASHBOARD



# VECTR USE CASE PANEL

### Edit Persist via Userinit Winlogon Test Case

**Status: Completed**

▶ || ■ ▲

**Attack Start** ⓘ ⚙

08/22/2022 17:28:15  
status changed to InProgress

**Attack Stop** ⓘ ⚙

08/22/2022 17:28:16  
status changed to Completed

**Sources** ⚙

**Targets** ⚙

192.168.1.105

**Red Team Details** ⚙

**Name**  
Persist via Userinit Winlogon

**Description**  
Persist on a system by creating an LNK in the user's startup folder that points an exe payload then adding the LNK to the userinit registry

**Technique** ⓘ Winlogon Helper DLL - T1547.004

**Phase** Persistence

**Operator Guidance**

```
cmd> reg.exe add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit" /t REG_SZ /f /d "C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe,%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\{{ Ink_name }}.lnk"
```

**Blue Team Details** ⚙

**Outcome**

TBD  Blocked  Alerted  Logged  None  N/A

**Outcome Notes**

No detection noted in SIEM logs around attack time 08/22/2022 17:28:15 for host 192.168.1.105 (pa-desktop-test01)

**Tags** 🏷

**CHECK LOGGING**

**Rules**

Sigma

**Detection Time**

08/22/2022 17:28:15  
outcome changed

**Defenses** ⓘ

SIEM  
Endpoint Protection

# Document Managament

- Overlap
- Use case manage, tune
- Created time, Report

Type	Key	Summary	P	Status	Resolution	Created ↓
	NFSC-259	T1003.004: LSA Secrets	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 28, 2022
	NFSC-257	T1564.004 Alternate Data Streams (ADS)	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 22, 2022
	NFSC-256	T1027.004 - Compile After Delivery	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 19, 2022
	NFSC-255	T1218.007: Msiexec	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 18, 2022
	NFSC-254	T1546.012 - Image File Execution Options Injection	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 8, 2022
	NFSC-253	T1037.001 - Logon Script (Windows)	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 8, 2022
	NFSC-252	T1574.008: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 8, 2022
	NFSC-251	T1555.004 - Access Saved Credentials via VaultCmd	^	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 7, 2022
	NFSC-250	T1505.004: IIS Components	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 5, 2022
	NFSC-249	T1546.007 - Netsh Helper DLL	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 5, 2022
	NFSC-248	T1574.002 - DLL Side-Loading	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jul 1, 2022
	NFSC-247	T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	=	IN PROGRESS ▼	Unresolved	Jun 30, 2022
	NFSC-246	T1021.005: VNC	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jun 29, 2022
	NFSC-245	T1087.004: Cloud Account	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jun 29, 2022
	NFSC-244	T1087.003: Email Account	=	DONE ▼	Done	Jun 29, 2022

# BREACH AND ATTACK SIMULATION



Open Source project



Test your SOC team against the latest threats used by real threat actors



Gameboard plugin  
(Red team vs Blue team)



Atomic red team plugin




Manual adversary



Automation

# CALDERA ARCHITECTURE

- Server and agent python 3
- Rat written in C#
- MongoDB
- Web interface JavaScript



# One team One dream



1. Process update
2. New tasks to assign
3. New ideas

# Detection coverage

## STEP 1


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ONLY SYSMON  
DETECTION

## STEP 2

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SYSMON + EDR  
DETECTION + BLOCKED




# RESULT

- False positive
- Caldera, Vectr update

Сүүлийн жилийн хугацаанд хийгдсэн use case улирлаар



SOC & EDR caldera халдлага илрүүлэлт



MITRE ATT&CK	SOC	EDR
Collection	100%	100%
Execution	100%	100%
Credentials access	100%	100%
Lateral movement	100%	100%
Privilege escalation	100%	100%
C&C	100%	100%

MITRE ATT&CK	SOC	EDR
Defense evasion	100%	100%
Exfiltration	100%	100%
Initial access	100%	100%
Persistence	100%	100%



**Thank you for your attention**

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