



Mongolian Cyber Emergency Response Team / Coordination Center

# Practical Recording of All TTY Sessions

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# About me

- FreeBSD user/sysadmin for over 18 years
- FreeBSD committer, doc - 2008, src - 2013
- MNCERT/CC advisor
- Worked for Government organizations, international project, ISP, mobile operator
- Do remote works related to FreeBSD - sysadmin, software development, consulting
- Hack ARM boards
- Football

# Content

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- Various TTY session recording tools, methods, problems
- OpenSSH server related configuration and considerations
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# Introduction

It is simply not good enough to know who logged into your server and when. There is a strong need for a complete record of the user's activity, either to ensure that no unauthorized changes were made, or to meet compliance requirements such as PCI DSS.

Being able to identify who made specific changes and quickly reviewing them enables the sysadmin to react appropriately to a wide range of situations where you'd be otherwise guessing at what specifically they did. These actions include someone adding a backdoor user account, making an unauthorized configuration change, or even making a mistake they don't catch right away.

## Why TTY session recording?

- Sometimes it is hard to find who did what on the system
- For security purpose - forensics
- PCI DSS requirements (10), compliance
- Can be good training material
- Catch mistakes and act accordingly

# Recording TTY sessions

- Record shell activity
- TTY recording
- Run at login
- More deeper -> Audit framework

# Various TTY session recording tools, methods, problems



## Tools and Methods

- script command
- asciinema
- Via shell history, etc
- sudosh or sudosh2 etc
- tmux or ssh logging but on client side
- ttyrec

and maybe many more, but ...

# Problems

- Terminal window related problems - Control characters, cursors, colors etc, vi/vim, emacs, mc, etc.
- cat/more long files makes a log bigger
- System admins don't like to logout, they want to stay forever
- How to run at login ? User can kill the process
- Do we need to make changes in shell rc or profile file?
- Anyone can see plaintext logs

# Problems

- Commands like script, ttyrec don't update utx/utmp database  
w command shows only ttyrec/script for the user, not the latest command

```
# w
10:37AM up 10 days, 21:36, 3 users, load averages: 0.58, 0.44, 0.37
USER      TTY      FROM          LOGIN@      IDLE WHAT
root      v0       -             14Sep17    10days -csh (csh)
test     pts/0    192.168.0.100 10:36AM    - ttyrec
test     pts/2    192.168.0.100 10:37AM    - w
```

- How about ssh?

# OpenSSH server

## Configuration and Considerations

- ForceCommand option - Run command or script when user login via ssh
- Problems - below cases should work
  - sftp
  - scp
  - some other commands - ls, etc

ttyrec, modifications, patches

# ttyrec

- ttyrec (headers)
  - sec - unix timestamp
  - usec -- 0..999999 microseconds
  - len -- length of the payload
  - Actual payload
- BSD license

# Modifications

- Option -l, that helps to reduce log (Antoine Amarilli <a3nm@a3nm.net>)
- Option -f, that will run shell if any crash happens (from same author as above)
- ssh command handling - scp, sftp etc
  - option -s to set sftp program
  - log ssh commands
- Set SETUID/SETGID bits and drop privileges later before running shell
  - chmod 4555 ttyrec

# Modifications

- Update utx/utmp database - w command will show correct outputs
  - ptsname() - gets the path of the slave pseudoterminal
- Use setproctitle() to set process title - linux needs libbsd-dev package and setproctitle\_init() call

```
# w
```

```
 2:19PM up 7 days, 18:58, 4 users, load averages: 0.54, 0.38, 0.29
```

USER	TTY	FROM	LOGIN@	IDLE	WHAT
tsgan	pts/0	192.168.0.100	10:47AM	-	_su (csh)
tsgan	pts/1	192.168.0.100	10:49AM	-	w
<b>test</b>	<b>pts/2</b>	<b>192.168.0.100</b>	<b>2:19PM</b>	-	<b>ttyrec: ssh-rec (ttyrec)</b>
<b>test</b>	<b>pts/3</b>	<b>192.168.0.100</b>	<b>2:19PM</b>	-	<b>top</b>



# Modifications

- Log, key file name format: host-YYYY-MM-DD\_HHhMMmSSs-user.ttyrec[.key]
- Encrypt log using stream cipher - AES-CTR (OpenSSL AES\_ctr128\_encrypt())
  - Option -p to set RSA public key to use
  - Generate random key and encrypt it to file using RSA public key
  - Use this generated random key to encrypt the log
  - Don't encrypt timestamps, len (ttyrec headers)
- ttydecrypt
  - Decrypt the encrypted key using RSA private key and then decrypt the log
  - Capsicumized for excersize (<https://wiki.freebsd.org/Capsicum>)

DEMO

# Patches

- The PoC patch for FreeBSD is at:

<https://github.com/tsgan/ttyrec-patch>

- Tested on FreeBSD 10.X, 11.X, Ubuntu 14.04 (with small changes to the patch)

## Further improvement ideas

- Maybe use OpenSSL EVP\_\* functions for encrypt/decrypt (AESNI hardware acceleration etc.)
- Log to centralized logging server
  - Use/integrate fluentd/graylog
  - Or write separate daemon
  - ...

# Useful links etc.

<https://github.com/mjording/ttyrec>

<http://asciinema.org>

<https://github.com/Conradlrwin/showterm>

<https://github.com/theonewolf/TermRecord>

<http://tty-player.chrismorgan.info/>

<https://github.com/jory/ttyplayer>

<https://github.com/yudai/gotty>

<https://github.com/krishnasrinivas/wetty>

<https://github.com/tmux-plugins/tmux-logging>

<https://github.com/tsl0922/ttyd>

<https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-unix-login-bash-shell-force-time-outs/>

<https://github.com/cloudposse/sudosh>

<http://a3nm.net/blog/ttyrex.html>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block\\_cipher\\_mode\\_of\\_operation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)

<https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP>

Thank you for your attention



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